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“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” (e.g., Matthew 7:12). The 
golden rule of most religions assumes that the cognitive abilities of perspective-taking 
and empathy are the basis of morality. According to Goldman (1995), you simulate what 
you would like to happen if you were in the situation of another and act accordingly. One 
would therefore predict that people that display difficulties in those abilities, such as 
people with psychopathy and autism, are impaired in morality. This seems to be 
confirmed by studies on psychopaths, who show deficits both in empathy and morality 
(Blair, Mitchell and Blair, 2005). However, Kennett (2002) and McGeer (this volume) 
suggest that in autism, the deficit of empathy does not lead to a deficit of morality. 
McGeer attempts to solve this paradox by investigating the “roots of moral agency”. She 
distinguishes a Kantian rational view of morality and a Humean emotional view of 
morality. She concludes that even if reason plays a key role in morality, this role is 
merely instrumental. Only emotions can constitute the motivation for moral behaviors. 
However, according to her, one should not reduce emotional motivation for morality 
solely to empathy. Other kinds of emotions may also play a role, emotions that would be 
available to people with autism.   
This interesting essay raises a major question, which is challenging both for moral 
philosophy and cognitive neuropsychiatry. Why do autistics have a sense of morality 
while psychopaths do not, given that they both display a deficit of empathy? We would 
like here to refine some of the views on autism and morality. In order to do so, we will 
investigate whether autism really challenges a Humean view of morality. We will then 
provide a new conceptual framework based on the distinction between egocentric and 
allocentric stances, which may help us to make some predictions about the autistic sense 
of morality.  
 
1. Autism: a challenge for a Humean view of morality? 
 
Autism raises the following paradox: 
(a) Humean view: Empathy is the only source of morality. 
(b) People who have no empathy should have no morality.  
(c) People with autism show a lack of empathy. 
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(d) People with autism show a sense of morality.  
To solve this paradox, McGeer refutes the premise (a) and its consequence (b). She 
concludes that empathy is not a necessary condition for morality. However, there may be 
other possibilities to solve the paradox, by refuting either (c) or (d). We will review these 
possibilities based on experimental works. However, we should keep in mind that both 
psychopathy and autism are heterogeneous and impairments can range from severe to 
hardly perceptible. In addition, it is necessary to make allowances for comorbidity 
between the two disorders. For our present purposes we will consider here AS individuals 
with normal or superior intellectual ability who show the following features: difficulty in 
reciprocal social interaction, communication impairments, a lack of flexibility with 
obsessive tendencies, and a single-minded pursuit of narrow interests.  
 
 A lack of empathy?  
According to McGeer, the common factor between autism and psychopathy is the 
lack of emotional empathy (premise c). One possibility is that empathy disorder results 
from abnormalities in emotion recognition and emotion matching in ASD (Hobson, 
1993). However, in studies where the verbal mental age was matched, children with 
autism have not been shown to be impaired in emotion recognition (Adolphs, Sears, & 
Piven, 2001; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1990; Prior, Dahlstrom, & Squires, 1990, 
Castelli, 2005). They have intact autonomic responses when viewing pictures of people 
who are sad or afraid. Furthermore, most of the tasks used to evaluate empathy in ASD 
require both cognitive and affective skills (e.g. Empathy Quotient, Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright, 2004). Consequently, they are unable to test emotional empathy per se. 
Emotion processing abnormalities in autistic disorders cannot be properly understood in 
terms of a lack of emotions, but rather in terms of less complex emotions, less regulation 
of emotions and less ability to reflect on one’s own emotions (Hill, Berthoz and Frith, 
2004). Individuals with ASD have difficulties in integrating the cognitive and affective 
facets of the other person's mental states (Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2002). None of these 
limitations rules out automatic emotional empathy. We assume that at least a subgroup of 
individuals with ASD may have emotional empathy, at least to some degree, even if they 
may not be able to reflect on their emotions.  
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The parallel drawn between psychopathy and autism based on a common lack of 
empathy does not seem to be fully justified. While psychopathy indeed is defined as 
severe disturbances in emotional empathy, it is less clear that individuals with ASD are 
unable to empathize (Blair, 2005). If we distinguish here between cognitive and 
emotional components of empathetic behaviours, we would claim that only the former is 
impaired in ASD, but not necessarily the latter. We attribute the lack of empathetic 
behaviour claimed by number of authors (Gillberg, 1991; Yirmiya et al., 1992) to 
mentalizing deficits (Batson et al., 1987). One may suggest that the partial integrity of the 
emotional component in people with ASD might explain why they show apparently 
preserved moral behaviours, in contrast with people with psychopathy. But do they really 
display a moral sense? 
 
 A sense of morality? 
According to McGeer, if psychopathy and autism share the same lack of empathy, 
they differ at the level of morality. Based on several quotations from Temple Grandin, 
McGeer argues that moral sensibility would be partially preserved in ASD (premise d). 
How can we go beyond introspective report and test morality experimentally? Moral 
rules can be applied both to guide our own actions and to judge other people’s actions. It 
is difficult to evaluate moral behaviours in ASD as several irrelevant factors can interfere 
with their actions, preventing them to act according to moral rules (e.g. executive 
disorder, for review see Hill, 2004). Here we will limit ourselves to moral judgments, 
which are more amenable to experimental investigations. Two distinctions are 
particularly useful: moral/conventional and wrong/bad.  
The distinction between conventional and moral has been a major breakthrough in the 
study of morality (Turiel, 1983; Smetana, 1985). Having a moral sense means being able 
to distinguish between a moral violation (e.g. pulling hair) and a conventional violation 
(e.g. chewing gum at school). The distinction is made from the age of 39 months and is 
cross-cultural (Smetana and Braeges, 1990; Song, Smetana and Kim, 1987). In folk 
psychology, moral violation is considered as universal and objective (Nichols & Folds-
Bennett, 2003). Conventional violation is merely a question of context and authority. 
Moral violation is less permissible than conventional violation. When asked why, 
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children’s replies reflect the belief that conventional violation depends on social order 
while moral violation involves someone being hurt. According to Blair, the sense of 
morality ultimately derives from a Violence Inhibition Mechanism (VIM) activated by 
distress cues. However, the story may not be as simple. 
Not all the phenomena that lead to someone being hurt can be considered as a 
consequence of a moral violation. Indeed, it is necessary to make the distinction between 
judging that something is wrong and judging that something is bad (Nichols, 2002). An 
earthquake killing thousands of people cause severe distress and pain, and as such is bad, 
but it is not wrong. Furthermore, if by hurting someone, you help her, then it cannot be 
considered as a moral violation. One should temper the temporary pain or distress with 
the global happiness or good for the person. The act cannot be evaluated in itself without 
its background and its consequences that may justify it or not. Punishment is thought to 
be appropriate only for moral and conventional transgressions, but not for non-
transgressions (cf. Davidson, Turiel, & Black, 1983; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996).  
There are thus at least three components in a moral violation: (1) it is a transgression 
of a normative rule, (2) this rule is not conventional or contextual and (3) the 
transgression involves someone suffering without further moral justification. The 
question is now whether people with ASD can detect moral violation.  
Blair (1996) tested the capacity to draw the distinction between moral and 
conventional in children with ASD. Subjects were asked about the permissibility, the 
seriousness and the “authority jurisdiction” of the violation. Individuals with ASD were 
not significantly different from controls on any of these questions. They were able to 
distinguish between moral and conventional violations, despite their impairment in theory 
of mind. Blair concluded that individuals with ASD were able to detect distress in others. 
However, there are at least two problems here.  
First, another study about recognition of faux-pas seems to refine the previous results. 
A faux-pas occurs when someone says something that he should not say because it may 
disturb or hurt someone else’s feelings. Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2002) showed that two 
Asperger individuals were able to detect the faux-pas, but not to understand them. 
Interestingly, they were not able to provide an appropriate explanation of why it was a 
faux-pas. They referred to violations of rules (e.g. you are not supposed to do that) rather 
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than to the fact that the victim of the faux-pas was hurt. This result is consistent with 
another study where subjects had to judge culpability in different stories (Grant et al., 
2005). Children with ASD were able to judge the culpability of children but were not able 
to justify why by appealing to the pain caused. We would like to suggest that people with 
ASD are able to detect someone’s distress, but are more interested in normative rules 
than in emotions.  
A second problem comes from the classical task used by Blair. The critical question 
to distinguish between moral and conventional concerns the “authority jurisdiction”: 
would it be O.K. for the child to do X if the teacher says that the child can? The rule is 
moral if the child should not do X even if the teacher says that the child can do X. 
However, to understand that does not mean that one understands that it is a moral 
violation. Indeed, it merely means that it does not depend on the teacher’s authority, it is 
beyond his or her jurisdiction. But it could depend on someone else’s authority, like one’s 
parents. If so, it would still be conventional. 
In conclusion, we are not convinced that there is as yet sufficient evidence to rule out 
the possibility that individuals with mentalizing impairment have an intact moral 
sensitivity. It rather seems that they are able to detect a transgression of a normative rule 
and detect someone else’s distress, but not necessarily to relate them to each other. 
Furthermore, there is no convincing evidence that they can understand that some rules are 
not conventional. Indeed, the introspective self-reports provided by McGeer can all be 
interpreted as the consequence of an acute sense of normative rules, but they do not 
provide any cue about the sense of morality. McGeer reports that Temple Grandin has no 
social intuition. The question is: does she have moral intuitions? Or is she merely an 
“expert computer program” as she claimed to be? We would like now to provide a new 
conceptual framework that may help to interpret the sense of morality in ASD. 
 
2. Egocentrism and allocentrism in social and moral cognition 
 
We suggest that it is misleading to characterize ASD as a lack of empathy associated 
with a preserved sense of morality. The limitations in social and moral cognition in ASD 
require a more subtle conceptual framework, which takes into account the difference 
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between two kinds of attitudes. We would like here to introduce a distinction between 
egocentrism and allocentrism in social cognition, based on the distinction that is made in 
visuo-spatial perception (Frith and de Vignemont, 2005). We propose that it makes a 
difference whether the other person can be understood using an egocentric stance (“you”) 
or an allocentric stance (“he/she/they”).  
The distinction between egocentric and allocentric representations was first made in 
spatial cognition (for review, see Jacob and Jeannerod, 2003). The spatial location of the 
same object can be encoded either in its perceptual relation to the agent (egocentric 
representation) or in its relation to other objects independently of the agent (allocentric 
representation). Each of these representations plays a specific role. The egocentric 
representation is directly linked to the actions that the agent can perform toward the 
object. The allocentric representation relates objects together and allows comparing them 
with each other. Similarly, one can have two different attitudes toward the same person. 
When we adopt an egocentric stance the other person is understood in her relationship 
with the self. This relationship can be based on more or less direct interactions (e.g. the 
person I am talking to), but also on social status (e.g. a member of my family or a 
colleague). What the other feels, thinks or does is relevant for the self. It is necessary to 
know the other according to an egocentric stance if one wants to interact with the other 
and to locate oneself in the social world. When we adopt an allocentric stance the other 
person is understood in her relationship with other people independently of the self.  The 
allocentric stance allows you to understand that people exist outside their interactions 
with you. It is necessary for understanding the mutual relationships between people. The 
allocentric stance is detached from interactions with people, while the egocentric stance 
is immersed in social interactions and directly connected to them.  
Egocentric and allocentric representations are normally in permanent interactions. 
The allocentric social knowledge is based on inferences drawn from memories of past 
egocentric interactions. Conversely, the egocentric stance is influenced by a wider 
allocentric knowledge of people. We suggest that this interaction is broken in Asperger 
syndrome.  
Consequently, individuals with Asperger syndrome display extreme egocentrism, 
disconnected from allocentrism. Their social world is self-focused. They may forget for 
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instance that people have their own life, outside their interaction with them. They often 
report being the victim and seem to be less sensitive to other people’s suffering. One 
example of the ambivalence of morality in ASD comes from the study of the sense of 
fairness using social economic games in simple one-to-one situations in autism (Sally and 
Hill, 2005). These games included the ultimatum and dictator games, where one partner 
can either offer or refuse a share of a given amount. High-functioning individuals with 
autism were using the same “irrational” principles as controls, that is, they refused to 
accept amounts given to them that were lower than about a third of the total and likewise, 
offered amounts that were somewhat less than half the given amount. People with ASD 
are sensitive whether they are treated fairly or not. This is consistent with egocentrism. 
Interestingly, in the dictator game, the distribution of the offers differed in ASD. Normal 
adults shaded their offers so that they could get one or two extra for themselves. In 
contrast, adults with autism seemed to obey to one of the two following rules: make a 
perfectly equal offer or keep everything. In this situation, there is no flexibility or degrees 
of fairness in ASD, unlike normal adults. The rule used in the dictator game is 
mathematical and rigid. This is the consequence of a very abstract allocentrism 
disconnected from egocentrism. People with ASD do not provide any description of how 
people do behave, but rather how people should behave. They live in a very normative 
social world.  We suggest that the so-called moral behaviors in ASD result from abstract 
allocentrism. They thrive on the idea of rules, as noticed by McGeer. This is shown 
whenever AS individuals talk about rules that other people might follow in their social 
interactions that they feel they have worked out by logical analysis:  
In first grade I became increasingly obsessed with rules. I studied people’s 
behaviors and actions and read written rules carefully to try to make sense of 
my school community and fellow human beings. (Dawn Prince-Hughes, 2002, 
p. 110)1 
Baron-Cohen and coll. (2003) showed that individuals with ASD had a higher score 
in systemizing quotient. Systemizing is defined as the drive to analyze, identify 
underlying rules and build systems. People with ASD do not necessarily appeal to 
                                                 
1 The following quotations are taken from Williams (2004). 
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emotions or other mental states to understand the social world, they merely predict other 
people’s behaviors on the basis of regularities between inputs, operations, and outputs: 
There is a process of using my intellect and logical decision making for every 
social decision. Emotion doesn’t guide my decision; it is pure computing. 
(Temple Grandin, 1996, p. 103) 
 People with ASD have social knowledge and are able to see social structures and 
relationships in a detached way that can give rise to a reputation of being cold and 
distanced. However, their personal logic for how the social and the moral world should 
work may be very formal and far from reality. It is even more difficult for them that 
ordinary people do not always follow the rules in our daily practice or can create their 
own rules (Dewey, 1991): 
There are days when just trying to make sense of the rules for social 
interaction is too difficult. It is especially so when we take into account that 
individuals often write their own rules! For example it’s fine to take your 
clothes off to have a bath, but only a model takes her clothes off for the 
photographer; or you can laugh at that story, even though it’s about a fat lady, 
because it’s a joke. (Wendy Lawson, 2001, p. 98) 
The human saga is just not reliable enough for me to predict (Liane Holliday 
Willey, 1999, p. 85) 
 It is not surprising that individuals with ASD are sensitive to normative rules, given 
that they only way they have to cope for their lack of social intuitions. Still it does not 
mean that the rules that they obey are nothing more than conventional for them. 
 
We tentatively suggest that most individuals with ASD are not insensitive to the 
distress of other people. However, their emotional empathy may not go far enough and 
does not necessarily explain why they are able to make normative judgments and indeed 
genuinely act in a law-abiding way. We suggest that they are more interested in 
normative rules than in emotions due to an abstract allocentrism disconnected from 
egocentric interactions with others. It is difficult to understand whether the normative 
rules they obey are merely conventional, extracted from their abstract analysis of their 
surrounding, or properly moral. Only in the latter case would they believe that moral 
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rules (as opposed to conventional rules) are objective and universal beyond anybody’s 
jurisdiction. Only then can we decide whether autism really does challenge a Humean 
view of morality.  
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